Quantum Geo-Encryption by Malaney, Robert
Quantum Geo-Encryption
Robert Malaney
School of Electrical Engineering & Telecommunications,
The University of New South Wales,
Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia
r.malaney@unsw.edu.au
Abstract—In this work we introduce the concept of quantum
geo-encryption - a protocol that invokes direct quantum encryp-
tion of messages coupled to quantum location monitoring of
the intended receiver. By obfuscating the quantum information
required by both the decrypting process and the location verifi-
cation process, a communication channel is created in which the
encrypted data can only be decrypted at a specific geographic
locale. Classical wireless communications can be invoked to
unlock the quantum encryption process thereby allowing for
any deployment scenario regardless of the channel conditions.
Quantum geo-encryption can also be used to realize quantum-
computing instructions that can only be implemented at a
specific location, and allow for a specified geographical data-route
through a distributed network. Here we consider the operational
aspects of quantum geo-encryption in generic Rician channels,
demonstrating that the likelihood of a successful spoofing attack
approaches zero as the adversary moves away from the allowed
decrypting location. The work introduced here resolves a long-
standing quest to directly deliver information which can only be
decrypted at a given location free of assumptions on the physical
security of a receiver.
I. INTRODUCTION
Geo-encyryption is an enhancement to traditional security
techniques in which the decryption process can only occur at
a specific geographic location. Clearly such an outcome, if
possible, would have important implications for a wide range
of scenarios. Many attempts have been made to deliver a
viable geo-encryption process, with varying degrees of success
[1]–[9]. However, the security of all known attempts at geo-
encryption is beholden to some assumed restriction on the
ability of an adversary, and/or tamper-proof assumptions on a
specific device. Ultimately, the necessity of such assumptions
detract from the geo-encryption paradigm and commercial
implementations of it have not occurred.
In this work we remove all debilitating assumptions from
the geo-encryption paradigm by introducing quantum infor-
mation into the decryption process. More specifically, we
show how the use of quantum information embedded on a
communication device can be used to simultaneously invoke
quantum direct communication (QDC) and quantum location
verification (QLV) that collectively realize a geo-encryption
solution that is secure against any known attack. We further
show how this new form of geo-encryption can be extended
to make the decryption of data viable not only at a specific
location, but also a specific time.
The notion of geo-encryption first appeared in the scientific
literature in 1996 where geo-encryption based on GPS signals
was discussed [1]. The main idea behind such classical geo-
encryption is the addition of a so-called geo-lock to the
standard SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) protocol [2]. The main
idea can be summarized thus. Encryption:- (i) A message
is encrypted in the normal manner by the sender using a
conventional cipher and associated session key Rk, randomly
generated by the sender. (ii) The sender decides the location Ld
and time td for which decryption is to be allowed. (iii) Based
on this Ld and td, the sender creates a geo-lock GL, which
is a binary string determined using an (known) algorithm to
convert information related to the anticipated signal metrics
a receiver at the decryption location and time should obtain
(e.g. specific frequencies at specific signal strengths). (iv) The
sender uses the geo-lock GL to XoR the key Rk, forming
a new key Gk. This new key is then encrypted using a
standard Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) private key to form
another new key, GE . Decryption:- (v) The receiver captures
the encoded message and the key GE using his own radio
antenna(s). (vi) The receiver proceeds to decrypt GE using
the sender’s RSA public key to obtain Gk. (vii) From the
received signal metrics the receiver computes GL, and applies
that to Gk to compute the session key Rk. (viii) The original
message is decrypted. A schematic of this process is illustrated
in Fig. 1.
Pivotal to the success of this protocol is that the received
signal information associated with the geo-lock cannot be
spoofed. Indeed, a series of steps can be put in place in
order to minimize such spoofing in civilian receivers [2],
and in the military sphere anti-spoof GPS receivers based on
encoded GPS signals are available. However, such techniques
are not immune to device tampering and/or the leaking (or
determination) of GPS decoding keys. This is particularly so,
when a quantum adversary is in place - namely an adversary
whose resources and abilities are confined only by the laws of
physics. In the presence of such an all-powerful adversary, the
above classical geo-encryption protocol is readily attacked. In
this work we will assume the presence of a quantum adversary.
The notion of QLV first appeared in the scientific literature
in 2010 as a means of securing real-time communications to
a unique spatial position [10]1. In [10] it was pointed out
how by monitoring the location of a device using classical
radio communications and quantum information embedded in
1Using the direct transfer of quantum entangled pairs in line-of-sight
conditions as an aid to ‘tagging’ (verifying) an object’s location appeared
in the patent literature in 2006 [11].
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Fig. 1. Classical Geo-Encryption. Although many details can be different in
different versions of this protocol, the use of a ‘Geo-lock’ key as illustrated
above encapsulates the main idea.
the device, real-time data could be delivered to a specific
geographic location. Data would be sent to the receiver only
whilst the QLV was validated. Through its use of classical
communications, QLV can be made operational under most
channel conditions including those without a direct line-of-
sight (LoS) component. Pivotal to this paradigm of communi-
cation throughput conditioned on the location of the receiver
is the anti-spoofing attributes of the specific QLV protocol
(spoofing is always possible in classical-only systems [12]). In
general terms, such anti-spoofing properties can be attributed
to the quantum no-cloning theorem [13] coupled with the no-
signaling principle of special relativity. Since the work of [10]
QLV has been further studied in numerous works with its
deployment and security under a wide range of conditions and
assumptions investigated. Details of this history and associated
references can be found in [14] where the notion of QLV is
discussed in the context of a quantum-enabled autonomous
vehicle. In [14] arguments for QLV’s security against any
known attack are also presented.
In this work we extend the notion of location-enabled
communications discussed in [10] to the decryption process
itself. Using any pre-existing secret key (or any key, e.g. one
generated dynamically with pre-existing shared entanglement)
will not suffice for our purposes as it could be distributed to
other adversaries at other locations (even though one adversary
is at the QLV validated location). However, as we show here,
by using QDC and by obfuscating the quantum information
needed by both the QDC and the QLV protocols until the time
of the decryption and verification processes, we shall see how
it is possible make the decryption of data itself conditional
upon the location of the receiver. Although more complex,
and requiring some quantum technological developments (e.g.
long-lived quantum memory), this form of geo-encryption
is free from the vulnerabilities that plague classical geo-
encryption protocols.
II. QUANTUM GEO-ENCRYPTION
In quantum geo-encryption we assume that most of the
quantum information to be used is pre-stored in the device that
will invoke the decryption (the decryptor). This information
could have been previously delivered to the decryptor via a
quantum information transfer link such as fibre optic cable or
LoS laser communications (or in real-time via teleportation).
We will also assume that the stored quantum states are forced
to be non-orthogonal, and in the wider context can take
any allowable form, e.g. continuous variable (CV) states,
qubits, qudits, hybrids, etc. We also allow for some states
being entangled - possibly with states at multiple reference
stations (RSs). The RSs are at known locations, assumed to
be legitimate members of the wider communication system,
and assumed to have secure quantum and classical (e.g. via
QKD) communications between themselves.
The basic idea in quantum geo-encryption is that encoded
signals (here we will take these signals to be classical) sent by
the RSs and arriving simultaneously at the receiver, instruct
the decryptor what specific quantum states should be used
(and for what process), any information (e.g. random unitary
matrices) needed to remove any non-orthogonality introduced,
any decoding instructions, and instructions on what output to
produce (e.g. a classical output to be broadcast or a state to be
teleported (or directly transferred) back to a specific RS). By
measuring the round-trip time associated with these procedures
the decryptor’s location can be verified (see [14] for more
details on QLV).
Due to the wide variety of forms that quantum information
can take, and the many variations on how that informa-
tion can be transferred, stored, manipulated, and/or retrieved
from the decryptor; unlimited versions of the quantum geo-
encryption protocol are possible. For the purpose of focus,
we will concentrate here on just one implementation of a
geo-encryption protocol involving qubits, Gaussian states, and
hybrids formed from combinations of such states. We choose
this version simply for its ease in demonstrating the most
important concepts of a quantum geo-encryption application.
In terms of the annihilation and creation operators aˆ, aˆ†, the
quadrature operators qˆ, pˆ defined for photon states are (~ = 2
assumed) qˆ = aˆ+ aˆ† and pˆ = i(aˆ†−aˆ ), satisfying [qˆ, pˆ] = 2i.
The quadrature operators for a CV state with N modes can
be defined by the vector Rˆ1,...,n = (qˆ1, pˆ1, . . . , qˆN , pˆN ).
Gaussian CV states are one of the work-horses of quantum
information (e.g. [15] for review). An important and widely
used Gaussian state, and one that will participate in our
protocol, is the coherent state |α〉 = exp
(
− |α|22
) ∞∑
n=0
αn√
n!
|n〉
written here in terms of the Fock (number) states |n〉. Gaussian
states are characterized solely by the first moments
〈
Rˆ1,...,N
〉
and for the N = 2 case a covariance matrix M , which can
be written
Ms =
(
A C
CT B
)
where A = a˜I2 , B = b˜I2 , C = diag (c+, c−),
a˜, b˜, c+, c− ∈ R, and I2 is the 2 × 2 identity matrix. In
this form the symplectic spectrum of the partially transposed
covariance matrix is ν± = ([∆±
√
∆2 − 4 detMs]/2)1/2 ,
where ∆ = detA + detB − 2 detC. From the symplectic
spectrum many fundamental properties of Gaussian states can
be derived (see [15]). An important Gaussian state is the
two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) state, described for two
modes a and b as
|s〉 =
√
1− λ2
∞∑
n=0
(−λ)n|n〉a|n〉b,
where λ = tanh(r) ∈ [0, 1] , and where |n〉a and |n〉b
are Fock states of modes a and b, respectively. Here, r is
a parameter quantifying the two-mode squeezing operator
S2(r) = exp
[
r
(
aˆbˆ− aˆ†bˆ†
)
/2
]
. The covariance matrix for
the TMSV state can then be written
MT =
(
vI
(√
v2 − 1)Z(√
v2 − 1)Z vI
)
where the quadrature variance v = cosh(2r), and Z : =
diag(1,-1). In wider geo-encryption protocols, TMSV states
will be deployed partly for their use in holding entanglement
between CV states at the RS and CV (or hybrid) states at the
decryptor.
In addition to Gaussian CV states we will also utilize
discrete two-dimensional states of the generic qubit form
a′ |0〉 + b′ |1〉, |a′|2 + |b′|2 = 1, which can be entangled
together to form higher multi-dimensional states of various
levels of entanglement. We will also utilize combinations such
as |α〉⊗ 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) to form hybrid forms of such states such
as 1√
2
(∣∣αe−iθ〉 |0〉+ ∣∣αeiθ〉 |1〉) for some arbitrary phase θ
(such states are not an absolute requirement for geo-encryption
- but they will help illustrate its operation better).
In QDC [16]–[19] we negate the use of QKD, but in-
stead encrypt the message we wish to send directly into a
series of quantum states (see [20] for recent review). Here,
we will utilize a form of QDC based on entangled qubit
pairs, namely the so-called ping-pong protocol [16].2 In the
ping-pong protocol a maximally entangled qubit pair, say
|ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |1〉+ |1〉 |0〉), is shared between the sender
and receiver. Depending on whether a 0 or a 1 is to be encoded,
the sender applies to its qubit an I = (|0〉 |0〉+ |1〉 |1〉) or an
σz = (|0〉 |0〉 − |1〉 |1〉) operation, respectively. This qubit (the
travel qubit) is sent to the receiver, who then performs a Bell
measurement on both qubits. From the possible two results
of this measurement, |ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |1〉+ |1〉 |0〉) or |ψ−〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 |1〉 − |1〉 |0〉), the encoded message is inferred. During
this process the sender-receiver pair can do other tests to
monitor for the presence of an eavesdropper. In our specific
form of the geo-encryption protocol we assume the (travel)
qubit sent by the sender to the receiver, is teleported to the
2We use this version of QDC here simply to illustrate the quantum geo-
encryption paradigm. We could also use other variants of QDC that have better
communications-security attributes, that use states other than qubits, and that
sometimes invoke additional classical communications.
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Fig. 2. Quantum geo-encryption using quantum information embedded at
the decryptor. The decryption instructions needed to access and act on the
relevant quantum information are sent from a collection of satellite and/or
terrestrial transmitters via classical radio communications. Prior to receiving
this information it is impossible for the decryptor to ascertain which quantum
states are associated with the QDC process and which states are associated
with the QLV process. Different shadowed colors indicate different roles
played by the qubits. Wiggled-arrows indicate entanglement. Dependent on
the instructions received at the decryptor, some classical result is sent by the
decryptor back to the radio transmitters (who now act as receivers).
receiver using another pair of maximally entangled qubits that
pre-exist between the sender and the receiver. The classical
radio communication associated with this teleportation will
form part of the geo-encryption protocol.
In our geo-encryption protocol we will obfuscate all quan-
tum information to be used in several ways. First, all stored in-
formation used in the wider geo-encryption protocol, including
all qubits, will have random unitary transformations applied
to each state prior to being transferred to the decryptor. The
classical information describing each of these unitaries will be
held by the legitimate system in an encoded and distributed
form - and will also form part of the radio communications
of the geo-encryption protocol.3 Some qubits will be part of
the QLV protocol and some will be part of the QDC protocol.
Some qubits will be entangled with other qubits and some
qubits will be entangled with CV states. Some of the entangled
states held by the decryptor will be entangled with states still
held by the legitimate system. The QLV protocol will also
partially use states from this same qubit grouping - the idea
being that since the receiver does not know which states are to
be used in each protocol - and since the QLV protocol demands
the states it needs be at the correct location - then the QDC
protocol is also tied to states that must be at the same location.
Any attempt to move quantum information that is required by
the QDC protocol (to another device at another location) will
3We will assume all classical signals are encoded with some block-size
(which can be large and made a priori unknown) and signals from multiple
RSs are needed for decoding. The number of RSs used (randomly selected
from those available) can form part of the decoding instructions, e.g. coding
the block-size used.
inevitably lead to a violation of the QLV protocol. By checking
simultaneously that the QLV passes all verification tests, we
can ensure the decryption process occurs only at the required
location.
Since we can also dictate the time when the required
classical information sent by the RSs reach the decryptor, we
can also ensure the decryption occurs at a specific time (at least
not before a specific time). Avoiding delayed decryption of a
complete message stream would require the QDC and QLV
outputs be intertwined (e.g. embed some of the information
needed by the QLV protocol within the QDC protocol).4
A schematic of a geo-encryption protocol is given in Fig. 2.
Not explicitly shown in Fig.2 are other quantum states (possi-
bly entangled) and other entanglement between quantum states
stored in memory and states stored at the RSs. Also not shown
are quantum transmitters (receivers) that may be added so as to
transmit (receive) quantum information to (from) the decryptor
if dictated to do so by the QLV protocol when conditions allow.
Using other quantum states held by the decryptor designated
for tasks beyond QDC and QLV, straightforward extensions
of the geo-encryption protocol can be used to produce any
quantum task (or output). For example, quantum computing
steps could be forced to occur at a specific computing chip
at a specific location. Such quantum computation steps could
be part of wider distributed quantum algorithm thereby adding
a new layer of security to distributed computing not offered
by classical machines. Routing of information - classical
and/or quantum - could also be enhanced in the sense that
routing decisions could be enforced to be viable only at
certain location-specific routers. This would allow for a chosen
geographic path to be chosen as the sole route for information
transfer. Clearly, many other enhanced application scenarios
exist for the geo-encryption paradigm.
Quantum geo-encryption is a rather more complex beast
than its classical counterpart, and a series technological ad-
vances are required before its real-world implementation can
occur. However, in the simplest forms of quantum geo-
encryption the main technological advance needed is the
development of reliable and long-lived quantum memory.
Rapid progress is being made in this endeavor (e.g. see [21],
[22]), and as such it is not inconceivable that quantum geo-
encryption will be deployable in the not-so-distant future.
III. THE DECRYPTING REGION
Thus far we have assumed the decryptor can be forced to
invoke decryption at a unique location - a specific point in
geographical space. In reality, due to inevitable noise (and any
processing delay) in the location verification procedures this
is not actually true in practice - devices that appear close to
(but not at) the location can (and should) pass the verification
4That is, strictly speaking we have thus far only considered the case where
decryption occurs in real-time (i.e. as soon as the decryptor has the required
information). However, it is straightforward to avoid delayed encryption by
ensuring that (at least some) information required for QLV is encoded in the
QDC quantum states - and that this information is not available until all states
that can be currently decrypted are in fact decrypted.
test. What occurs in practice is we limit the decryption process
to occur in an effective region or area of geographical space.
The dimensions of this region can be thought of as being set
according to a probability Pc that the received timings are
consistent with the decryptor being at the location it claims
to be at (the likelihood of the timing measurement is used by
the QLV decision-making process). Setting a required Pc can
therefore be visualized as setting an effective region in space
(e.g. an error ellipse) within which a position - determined
from the timings - must lie within with probability Pc. The
probability of any adversary spoofing the system approaches
zero the further she actually is from this region.
The size of the effective region is highly dependent on
the nature of the radio communications channel used in the
quantum geo-encryption protocol, most importantly on the
weight of the non-LoS component in the channel relative
to scattered components in the channel. Note that non-LoS
components can be of a real or virtual nature. In the latter
case, no visible LoS between the sender-receiver pair exists,
but energy in the LoS component is still detected by the
receiver. Such an effect is due to the well-known penetration
power (dependent on the radio frequency and the composition
of the obstructing object) of radio waves. Such penetration
capabilities underpin so-called ‘see-through-the wall’ radars
[23] and Ultra-Wide-Band (UWB) location systems [24], [25].
Recent advanced deployments have demonstrated virtual LoS
detection through 20cm thick concrete walls [23].5
To understand in general terms the scale of the decrypting
region let us consider a very general model for the wireless
channel - the Rician channel. Such a channel between a sender
a with Na antennae (linear array) and a receiver b with one
antenna can be described by hab (the 1×Na channel vector),
where
hab =
√
Kab
1 +Kab
hoab +
√
1
1 +Kab
hrab,
where Kab denotes the Rician K-factor of the channel,
hoab denotes the LoS component of the channel, and h
r
ab
denotes the scattered component of the channel - the ele-
ments of which are assumed to be i.i.d complex Gaussian
random variables with zero mean and unit variance, i.e.,
hrab ∼ CN (01×Na , INa). In the above, hoab can be expressed
as hoab =
[
1, · · · , exp (j2pi (Na − 1) δa cos θab)
]
, where δa
denotes the constant spacing (in wavelengths) between the
antennas of the linear array, and θab is the angle defined by the
direction of the linear array and the direction to the intended
receiver. In the following to simplify the discussion we will
ignore the directional information afforded to us by the linear
array (i.e. we ignore angle-of-arrival information) - bearing in
5Henceforth we will ignore the tiny delay caused by propagation through
objects - as this error (related to the dimension of the obstruction) can
be encapsulated into the effective region (the set Pc value). In the rare
circumstance where no set-up can allow for a virtual LoS component to
be present at the decryptor, the error introduced can be estimated and also
folded into a new effective region. Details of such issues and strategies around
optimal NLoS detection/mitigation are beyond the scope of the present work.
mind that its inclusion usually assists in the performance of
any location-verification algorithm.
The critical determination to be made in any channel is the
time-of-arrival (ToA) information obtained by the RSs. The
best approach to use for this problem is strongly dependent
on the signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio of the channel. In the high-
noise SNR regime it is known that the Cramer Rao Bound
(CRB) provides a tight bound on the timing error, whereas in
the low-noise regime the Ziv-Zakai Bound (ZZB) is known to
be tighter (more pragmatically useful) e.g. [26].
Consider some signal pulse Φ(t) = ωs(t − T ) + n(t),
for some signal template s(), time t, channel coefficient
ω, ToA T , and additive white Gaussian noise n(t) with
zero mean and spectral density N0/2. The CRB on the
ToA is then given by
(
2
√
2piβ
√
SNR
)−1
, where β2 =(∫∞
−∞ f
2
∣∣∣S(f)2∣∣∣ df) /(∫∞−∞ ∣∣∣S(f)2∣∣∣ df), and where f is the
frequency and S(f) is the Fourier transform of s(t). As we
can see, in principal for large enough SNR the CRB can be
driven to zero. This CRB result is modified in the presence of
multipath components (i.e. some finite Kab). Nonetheless, as
long as Kab > 0, in principal the ToA can still be driven to
zero.
The ZZB bound has the advantage that a priori channel
information can be easily encapsulated to form a better estima-
tor. In the high SNR limit and for unbiased conditions the ZBB
provides the same bounds as the CRB. The optimal detector
for the ZZB ToA estimator has been derived in [27] for UWB
Rician channels. We note the ZBB is based on constructions
of a likelihood ratio test (LRT) for optimum decision rules.
Once having determined the timing error associated with the
relevant ToA its role in setting the scale of the decrypting
region can be determined via analysis.
For ease of exposition, here we will determine a CRB
estimate of the location error bounds given some Gaussian
distribution on the ToA timing errors (e.g. [28]–[30]). In the
following we denote the true location of the decryptor by
ζ0 = [x0, y0] and the location of the nth RS by ζn = [xn, yn].
To counteract the impact of unknown bias in the timings (e.g.
synchronization offsets or constant NLoS bias) it is normally
useful to move to a time difference of arrival setting (TDoA).
To achieve this we denote the time difference relative to that
measured by RS 1 at the nth RS as φn, then the logarithm of
the distribution of φn is obtained as
− ln f (φn) =
(
φn − dn−d1c
)2
4c2σ2t
,
where c is the speed of light, σ2t is the variance of the timings,
and the distance between the nth RS and the decryptor is
expressed as dn =
√
(xn − x0)2 + (yn − y0)2. The Fisher
matrix for the TDoA scheme can then be written
J (φn) =
[
J (φn)11 J (φn)12
J (φn)21 J (φn)22
]
,
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Fig. 3. The Cramer Rao Bounds associated with a typical set-up of quantum
geo-encryption. Here we have used anticipated timing errors associated with
state-of-the-art radio detection systems and have used a TDoA scheme using
four radio receivers. We have also indicated the associated error ellipses at
two points in the simulated space which illustrate the effect noise can have in
blurring the allowed location into an effective allowed region. Here, we have
assumed processing delays are negligible.
where
J (φn)11 =
1
2c2σ2t
N∑
n=2
(cos θn − cos θ1)2 ,
J (φn)22 =
1
2c2σ2t
N∑
n=2
(sin θn − sin θ1)2 ,
and
J(φn)12 =
1
2c2σ2t
N∑
n=2
(sin θn − sin θ1) (cos θn − cos θ1) .
Here, θn = arctan[(yn − y0)/(xn − x0)]. We can now ex-
press the covariance matrix of the decryptor’s location as
Vpos = J
−1. We further define Vpos as
Vpos =
[
σ2x σxy
σyx σ
2
y
]
,
where σxy = σyx. We denote the estimated decryptor’s
location by ζe = [xe, ye], and the correlation coefficient
by ρ = σxy/(σxσy). Making the usual assumption that the
likelihood function of the parameters to be determined is
Gaussian in the vicinity of the true values, the distribution
of the estimated decryptor’s location can be expressed as
P (ζe) =
1
2pi
√
1−ρ2σxσy
×
exp

− 12(1−ρ2)(
(xe−x0)2
σ2x
+ (ye−y0)
2
σ2y
−2ρ(xe−x0)(ye−y0)σxσy
)  .
Using the above analysis, Fig. 3 displays the anticipated
CRB’s for a set-up of four RSs. Here we have assumed cσt =
1.8m and the RSs are of order 100m away toward the corners
of the simulation area (moving the RSs beyond about 1km has
the simple effect of flattening the CRB plane to a constant
error of about 7m). As we can see very reasonable errors in
the location verification will be possible for such settings. We
have also shown the error ellipse for two specific points (the
ellipse center indicates the point) using an eigenvalue analysis
of the inverse Fisher matrix to set the scale and orientation of
the ellipse axes. Multiplying these axes by a factor of three will
lead to a scenario in which a location estimate of the decryptor
(which if truly at the ellipse center) would be placed outside
the expanded ellipse with probability  = 0.01.
A more sophisticated analysis of the decrypting region can
be given, as well as a more detailed probability analysis, that
takes into account all a priori information and allows for
decision-making even when a location cannot be determined -
for example when less than three RSs with accurate ToAs are
available (e.g. see [14] where a more direct decision-making
process for QLV was adopted using optimal decision theory
derived from a LRT). Nonetheless, the analysis provided
here already shows that for anticipated conditions a well-
defined and pragmatically-useful decryption region can be
readily determined. For a given , the size of the region can
be very small (of order of cm) or very large (of order of
km), dependent on many factors such as timing resolution,
frequency bandwidth, transmitter power (regulatory limits etc)
and channel conditions. As such, quantum geo-encryption can
in principle be used in a wide range of real-world scenarios.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have introduced quantum geo-encryption
- a protocol that can allow data-decryption to occur at only
one location and one specified time. We have also discussed
how this same protocol can be extended to provide the same
spatial and temporal characteristics to any quantum task. Other
useful security outcomes, such as enforcing a pre-specified
route for data transfer, are also possible. In reality, issues
arise when using an actual specific point for the allowed
location. In real-world deployments the allowed location in
practice becomes an allowed effective region. This region
accommodates noise issues that allow for timings that are not
exactly consistent with a single geographical point. However,
when assessment of the channel conditions is taken, the size
of such an effective region can be readily determined and the
probability of spoofing the system assessed.
The specific protocol we have used in this work for the geo-
encryption can be replaced by many different variants, each
having their own trade-offs in terms of complexity versus per-
formance. Quantum geo-encryption opens up, for the first time,
the possibility of delivering encrypted communications in the
knowledge that the received signals can only be decrypted
by a device at a unique geographical location (free from the
type of attacks that have hindered deployment of classical geo-
encryption). In the coming years, the technological innovations
required for a quantum-geo encryption implementation (e.g.
long-lived quantum memory) will be at hand.
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